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Abstrat: In the ontext of applied game theory in networking environments, anumber of onepts have been proposed to measure both eieny and optimalityof resoure alloations, the most famous ertainly being the prie of anarhy and theJain index. Yet, very few have tried to question these measures and ompare themone to another, in a general framework, whih is the aim of the present artile.Key-words: Game theory, prie of anarhy, Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality,Braess-like paradox.
Comment mesurer l'eaité?Résumé : Dans le adre de la théorie des jeux appliquée aux réseaux de ommuniations,de nombreux onepts ont été proposés an de mesurer l'eaité et l'optimalité desméanismes d'alloation de ressoures, les plus élebres exemples étant probablementle prix de l'anarhie et l'index de Jain. Cependant, rares sont eux qui ont herhéà étudier es mesures et à les omparer entre elles, dans un ontexte général. C'este que propose de faire et artile.Mots-lés : Théorie des jeux, prix de l'anarhie, équilibres de Nash, optimalité dePareto, paradoxes de Braess.
How to measure eieny? 31 IntrodutionThe networking ommunity has witnessed an impressive amount of work based onappliations of game theory onepts. This paper fouses here on the ones dealingwith haraterizations of performane of general poliies.We do not deal here with the hoie of users utility funtions. We onsidersome general utilities u, may they represent throughput, experiened delays. . . or anyutility funtion and study in this paper dierent alloation poliies. We distinguishin partiular two kinds of poliies: those who are index-based, that is to say that result on the optimization ofa given funtion, as for example the Nash Bargaining Solution (also alledproportional fairness), that maximizes the produt of the users' utilities, orthe soial utility (maximizing their sum). general poliy optimization. Those do not optimize a spei funtion. Themost ommon example being the Nash equilibrium.While many denitions of eieny measure an be found in the literature, atthe present day, it seems that no fully satisfatory onept is available. The goal ofthis artile is to present and study various ommonly used haraterizations of theperformane of poliies.After introduing some general notations (Setion 2), we present some qualitativeharaterization of the alloations (Setion 3): in partiular the notion of Paretoeieny (a general notion of eieny), of index-optimization (that would reetsome partiular property of eient points, as for example fairness), and Braess-likeparadoxes (a partiularly non-desirable property of alloation poliies). We thenanalyze properties of alloations, in partiular regarding ontinuity (whih ensuressome stability of the alloation for slight hanges of the resoures) and monotoniity(whih ensures that an adding of resoures will always be beneiary to the users).Then, in Setion 4, we onsider quantitative measures of eieny. In partiular,we disuss the onepts of Jain index, Prie of anarhy (and more generally of index-optimizing based metris) and the reently introdued SDF (Selshness DegradationFator).2 NotationsWe onsider a n-player game, eah of them having a utility funtion whose valuesbelong to R+. A utility set U is thus a subset of Rn+. Let H(Rn+) denote the setRR n° 6216
4 A. Legrand & C. Touatinon-empty ompat sets of Rn+ and C(Rn+) denote the set of non-empty ompat andonvex sets of Rn+. In the rest of this artile, we assume that U the set of all utilitysets is either equal to H(Rn+) or C(Rn+). Any negative result regarding C(Rn+) alsoapplies to H(Rn+).We dene in this setion the two kinds of alloation studied (index-based or not)and two onepts that will turn useful for the analytial study, namely the Hausdormetri and some anonial partial orders.Denition 1 (Poliy funtion). A poliy funtion α : U → Rn+ is a funtion suhthat for all U ∈ U , α(U) ∈ U .Poliy funtions dened on H(Rn+) are said to be general poliy funtion andpoliy funtions dened on C(Rn+) are said to be onvex poliy funtion.Note that in this framework, we do not onsider poliy optimization that dependon previous states of the system. Suh systems an our for instane when onsid-ering dynami systems where Nash equilibria adjusts to the system evolution. In theevent of multiple equilibria, the initial onditions have an impat on the onvergenepoint.Denition 2 (Index-optimizing). An index funtion f is a funtion from Rn+ to
R+. Let f be an index funtion from Rn+ to R+. A poliy funtion α is said to be
f -optimizing if for all U ∈ U , f(α(U)) = supu∈U f(u).Index may also be alled aggregation operators [2℄To study the ontinuity of poliy funtions, we need a topology on U . That iswhy in the following, we use the lassial metri on ompat sets.Denition 3 (Hausdor metri). Considering a metri funtion d on Rn+, one andene the distane from x to the ompat B as:
d(x,B) = min{d(x, y)|y ∈ B}The distane from the ompat A to the ompat B as:
d(A,B) = max{d(x,B)|x ∈ A}The Hausdor distane between two ompats A and B an thus be dened as:
h(A,B) = max(d(A,B), d(B,A))
(H(Rn+), h) and (C(Rn+), h) are omplete metri spaes [1℄ and we an thus studythe ontinuity of poliy funtions under pretty lean onditions. INRIA
How to measure eieny? 5Denition 4 (Canonial partial orders). We onsider the following orders as beinganonial. The anonial partial 4 order on Rn+ is dened by:
u 4 v ⇔ ∀k : uk 6 vk The anonial partial order on H(Rn+) is the lassial inlusion order: ⊆.The two lassial strit partial order ≺ and ⊂ are dened aordingly. We also dene an additional strit partial order ≪ on Rn+, namely the stritPareto-superiority, by:
u ≪ v ⇔ ∀k : uk < vk3 Qualitative CharaterizationsIn this setion, we fous on qualitative haraterizations of performane of alloa-tions. Of partiular interest are: The notion of Pareto optimality: a onepts that dene the set of points of Uthat are globally optimal, Index or aggregation operators: they reet the optimality of a point withrespet of a partiular riterion, Braess-like paradoxes: reets whether an inrease of the system resoure anbe detrimental to all users onurrently.The rest of this setion is organized as follows: after dening these three funda-mental onepts, we study the link between Pareto-optimality and index optimiza-tion, the ontinuity of alloations and their monotoniity.3.1 Common DenitionsWe reall here the denitions of Pareto optimality, index-optimizing funtion andBraess-like paradoxes.Denition 5 (Pareto optimality). A hoie u ∈ U is said to be Pareto optimal if
∀v ∈ U,∃i, vi > ui ⇒ ∃j, vj < uj.RR n° 6216
6 A. Legrand & C. TouatiIn other words, u is Pareto optimal if it is maximal in U for the anonial partialorder on Rn+.A poliy funtion is said to be Pareto-optimal if for all U ∈ U , α(U) is Pareto-optimal.The key idea here is that Pareto optimality is a global notion. Even in systemsthat onsists of independent elements, the Pareto optimality annot be determinedon eah independent subsystem. Suh phenomena has been exhibited in [6℄. Theonsidered system is a master-slave platform in whih the master an ommuniatewith as many slaves as it needs at any time. The master holds a innite numberof tasks orresponding to N appliations, and eah of them an be exeuted onany slave. The authors study the system at the Nash equilibrium (eah appliationompeting with eah other for both resoure and CPU). Although the problemsassoiated with eah mahine is independent, the authors show that for any systemwith one slave the equilibrium is Pareto optimal, while Pareto ineieny an ourin multiple slave systems.Denition 6 (f -inreasing). A poliy alpha is said to be f -inreasing if f ◦ α ismonotone. Any f -optimizing poliy is thus f -inreasing.Denition 7 (Common Indexes). Many dierent indexes have been proposed inthe literature. We present a few ones: Arithmeti mean: ∑i ui. Minimum: mini ui. Maximum: maxi ui. Geometri Mean: also alled Nash Bargaining Solution or proportional fair-ness ∏i ui. Harmoni Mean: 1∑
i
1/ui
. Quasi-arithmeti Mean: f−1( 1n ∑ni=1 f(ui)) where f is a stritly monotoneontinuous funtion on [0,+∞]. The partiular ase where f is dened by
f : x → xδ has been widely studied [7℄. The ve previous index are partiularase of this index for partiular values of δ (respetively, 1,−∞,+∞, 0 and
−1). Jain: (∑ ui)2∑
u2
i
(see [3℄). INRIA
How to measure eieny? 7 Ordered Weighted Averaging: OWA(u1, . . . , un) = ∑i wi.uσ(i) where σ isa permutation suh that uσ(1) 6 uσ(2) 6 · · · 6 uσ(n).All these indexes are ontinuous, however, some of them are not stritly monotone.Denition 8 (Braess-paradox). A poliy funtion α is said to have Braess-paradoxesit there exists U1 and U2 suh that
U1 ⊂ U2 and α(U1) ≫ α(U2)with ≫ dened as in denition 4. A poliy funtion suh that there is no Braess-paradox is alled Braess-paradox-free.3.2 Pareto-optimality and Index OptimizationPareto optimality and monotoniity of the index optimization are losely related, asillustrated in the following results.Theorem 1. Let α be an f -optimizing poliy. If f is stritly monotone then α isPareto-optimal.Proof. Suppose that α is not Pareto optimal. Then, there exists U suh that α(U)is not Pareto optimal. Hene, there exists v ∈ U suh that α(U) ≺ v, and hene
f(α(U)) < f(v), whih ontradits the denition of α(U).Theorem 2. Let α be an f -optimizing poliy. If α is Pareto-optimal then f ismonotone.Proof. Suppose that f is not monotone. Then there exists u ≺ v suh that f(v) ≺
f(u). Consider U = {u, v}. As u ≺ v and α is Pareto-optimal, then α(U) = v whihis in ontradition with f(v) ≺ f(u).The Jain index is an example of non-monotone index. The min and the maxindex are also not stritly monotone, whih is why, max-min fairness or min-maxfairness are reursively dened in the literature.3.3 ContinuityLet us assume that the set of resoures is modeled as a ompat R of Rp+ and thatutility of users g are ontinuous funtions from Rp+ to R+. Then utility sets U arebuilt with the help of R and g.RR n° 6216
8 A. Legrand & C. Touati
U :
{
(H(Rn+), C(R
p
+, R+)) → H(R
n
+)
(R, g) 7→ {g(r)|r ∈ R}The mapping U being ontinuous, α◦U represents the sensibility of the alloationwith respet to resoures and utility funtions. Continuity of the alloation α is thusan essential feature. Indeed, it ensures that a slight hange in the system resoureswould not signiantly aet the alloation. In dynamially hanging systems, thisensures a ertain stability. It also ensures that a slight error in utility funtions doesnot aet too muh the alloation.Theorem 3. The Pareto set of a onvex utility set is not neessarily ompat.The funtion P from C(Rn+) to H(Rn+) that assoiates to U the losure of itsPareto set is not ontinuous.Proof. Let us rst exhibit a onvex utility set whose Pareto set is not losed. Let
C = {(x, y, z) ∈ R3+|x
2 + y2 6 1, 0 6 z 6 1 − 12
x2−2y2+1
1−y }. The set C is depitedon Figure 1. We have P(C) = {(x, y, 1 − 12 x2−2y2+11−y )|x2 + y2 6 1, x + y > 1, x >
0} ∪ {(0, 1, 1)}, whih is not losed.
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Figure 1: Convex set whose Pareto set is not losed. The segment [A,B[ does notbelong to the Pareto set.Let us onsider P from C(Rn+) to H(Rn+) that assoiate to U the losure of itsPareto set. Figure 2 depits a onverging sequene of onvex Cn suh that P(Cn)does not onverge to P(C∞). INRIA
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C0 P(C0) Cn P(Cn) C∞
P(C∞)
Figure 2: P is not ontinuous.Theorem 4. Let α be a general Pareto-optimal poliy funtion. α is not ontinuous.Proof. We prove that α annot be ontinuous with the simple instanes depited onFigure 3. The only Pareto-optimal points are A and B. Therefore α has to hoose inthe rst set between A and B. If A1 is hosen, then by moving A1 to A0, the hoiehas to jump to B, hene α is not ontinuous.
A0
B
An
B A∞ B
Figure 3: General Pareto-optimal poliies are disontinuous: a path leading to dis-ontinuity.Remark 1. There exists ontinuous and non-ontinuous onvex Pareto-optimal pol-iy funtions.Proof. Let us onsider a poliy funtion α optimizing the sum of utilities. Thetwo onvex sets on Figure 4 show that α is not ontinuous around the set K =
{(x, y)|x + y 6 1}. This disontinuity is due to the fat that many dierent pointsof K simultaneously optimize the sum.The poliy funtion α optimizing the produt ∏ of utilities is ontinuous though.As ∏ is stritly monotone, α is Pareto-optimal. Moreover, as for any c, Ic = {x ∈RR n° 6216
10 A. Legrand & C. Touati
Figure 4: Optimizing ∑: a disontinuous onvex poliy.
R
n
+|
∏
xi > c} is stritly onvex, for any onvex, there is a single point optimizing the∏. Let us assume by ontradition that α is not ontinuous at the point C. Thenthere exists Cn onverging to C and suh that xn = α(Cn) onverges to x∞ 6= α(C).As our sets are ompat, there exists a sequene yn ∈ Cn suh that yn onverges to
α(C). By denition, we have ∀n,∏(yn) 6 ∏(xn). Therefore ∏(α(C)) 6 ∏(x∞),whih is absurd as α(C) is optimal in C for ∏ and α(C) 6= x∞.3.4 MonotoniityWe state in this sub-setion two results on monotoniity of index and poliy funtions.The rst one emphasizes that index-funtions only measures a spei harateristiof performane measure, and are hene not ompatible. This explains why alloationsthat are eient (optimizing the arithmeti mean) annot (in general) also be fair(optimizing the geometri mean).The seond result states that, even when restrited to onvex utility sets, poliyfuntions annot be monotone. This infers that even in Braess-free systems, andinrease in the resoure an be detrimental to some users.Theorem 5. Let f and g be two monotone index funtions. A g-optimizing poliy
αg is f -inreasing if and only if αg is f -optimizing.Proof. If αg is f -optimizing, then αg is learly f -inreasing.Let us assume that αg is not f -optimizing. We dene the partial order ≺f (resp.
≺g) on Rn+ by x ≺f y i f(x) 6 f(y). We have ≺f 6=≺g, otherwise αg would be
f -optimizing. Thus there exists x1 and x2 suh that: x1 ≺f x2 and x2 ≺g x1.Considering U = {x1} and U ′ = {x1, x2}, shows that αg is not f -inreasing. INRIA
How to measure eieny? 11In other words, a poliy optimizing an index f is always non-monotone for adistint index g.Theorem 6. Even if onvex, poliy funtions annot be monotone.Proof. Let us onsider α a monotone onvex poliy funtion and let us onsider thethree following onvex sets U1 = {(0, 1)}, U2 = {(1, 0)}, and U3 = {(x, 1 − x)|0 6
x 6 1} (see Figure 5).
U1
U2
U3
Figure 5: Even onvex poliy funtions annot be monotone.We neessarily have α(U1) = (0, 1) and α(U2) = (1, 0). As U1 and U2 are subsetsof U3, we have α(U3) < (1, 1), whih is absurd beause no suh point belongs to
U3.3.5 ConlusionIn this setion, we have established the following results: Indexes should be stritly monotone to ensure Pareto-Optimality. Continuity (of alloations) is only possible when onsidering onvex utility sets. It is impossible to ensure that the growth of the utility set does not inur thederease of the utility of some player (i.e. poliy funtions annot be monotone,even when restriting to onvex utility sets). A poliy optimizing a given index f leads to errati values of an other index gwhen growing utility sets (unless f and g indue the same optimization).RR n° 6216
12 A. Legrand & C. TouatiNote that even though being Braess-paradox-free does not lead to bad properties,it does not give any information on the eieny of suh poliies. For example,an alloation α that would be dened as returning 1/1000 of the NBS to all userswould obviously be Braess-paradox-free but is very ineient. This alls for morequantitative haraterization of eieny.4 Quantitative CharaterizationsHow to measure the eieny of a given poliy is still an open question. Manyapproahes have been proposed in the literature but we will see in Setion 4.1 thatnone of the previously proposed approah is fully satisfying. We disuss in partiularthe most two popular ones: the Jain index [3℄ and the Prie of Anarhy [5℄. Thenin Setion 4.2, we propose a new metri based on a more topologial point of viewand explain how it relates to the notion of ε-approximation [8℄.4.1 Disussion4.1.1 Jain indexThe Jain eieny measure (or Jain index) [3℄ of a hoie u is dened as (∑ ui)2
n
∑
u2
i
.The Jain index is thus the ratio of the rst to the seond moment of the hoie u.Hene, it is a good measure of a hoie fairness (as dened by max-min fairness).The Jain index has many interesting properties: It is independent of the number of users. It remains unhanged if the utility set is linearly saled. It is bounded (by 1/n and 1). It is ontinuous.It an be straight-forwardly adapted to any measure of fairness when onsideringthe ratio of the rst and seond moment of z where for all i, zi = ui/vi where vi isthe fair onsidered point. Another interpretation of the Jain index is to write it as:
1/n
∑
i(ui/uf ) where uf = (∑u2i )/(∑ ui). Then eah ui/uf represents the ratio ofthe hoie with the fair alloation. The Jain is then the mean of these values. Theindex is therefore onsidered a useful distane measure to a given fair point.INRIA
How to measure eieny? 13The interest of the Jain fator is to determine whih users are disriminated, andwhih are favored in a given alloation. Transfer of share from favored to disriminateusers always inrease the index, while the opposite redues it.However, as we have seen in Setion 3.2 the Jain index is non-monotone (seeFigure 6(a)), hene optimal solutions for the Jain index may not be Pareto-optimal.Even worse, some max-min fair alloations (that are as fair as possible) may havesub-optimal Jain index. Suh an example is given on Figure 6(b).
α = 1
α = .9
α = .8
α = .7
α = .7
α = .8
α = .9
(a) Isolines for the JainIndex: this index is notmonotone.
α = 1
α = .96
(b) The max-min fair alloationmay have a sub-optimal Jain index.Figure 6: Highlighting Jain's index aws.4.1.2 Prie of Anarhy and Index-Optimizing Based MetrisIndex-optimizing based metris are easy to ompute, ontinuous and generally on-serve Pareto-superiority (under some mild onditions). It is thus natural to seletan index f and to try to ompare an alloation to the optimal one for f . Papadim-itriou [5℄ introdued the now popular measure prie of anarhy that we will studyin this setion.For a given index f , let us onsider α(f) a f -optimizing poliy funtion. Wedene the ineieny If (β,U) of the alloation β(U) for f as
If (β,U) =
f(α(f)(U))
f(β(U))
> 1
= max
u∈U
f(u)
f(β(U))
. (1)RR n° 6216
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t AlloationMax-min Alloation
u1
00
1
N−1
uk
M
1
Figure 7: Utility set and alloations for SM,N (N = 3,M = 2), with u2 = · · · = uN .Papadimitriou fouses on the arithmeti mean Σ dened by Σ(u1, . . . , uk) = ∑Kk=1 uk.The prie of anarhy φΣ is thus dened as the largest ineieny:
φΣ(β) = sup
U∈U
If (β,U) = sup
U∈U
∑
k α
(Σ)(U)k∑
k β(U)kIn other words, φΣ(β) is the approximation ratio of β for the objetive funtion Σ.This measure is very popular and rather easy to understand. However, we will seethat it may not reet what people have in mind when speaking about prie ofanarhy.Consider the utility set SM,N = {u ∈ RN+ |u1/M + ∑Nk=1 uk 6 1} depited inFig 7. As the roles of the uk, k > 2 are symmetri, we an freely assume that
u2 = · · · = uN for metrial index-optimizing poliies.Remark 2. This example was taken from the master-slave sheduling problem of [6℄.It is then easy to ompute the following index optimizing alloation: α(Σ)(SM,N) = (M, 0, . . . , 0) orresponds to the alloation optimizing the aver-age utility; α(min)(SM,N ) = ( 1N−1+1/M , . . . , 1N−1+1/M ) orresponds to the max-min fairalloation [9℄; α(Π)(SM,N ) = (MN , 1N , . . . , 1N ) orresponds to the proportionally fair alloationwhih is a partiular Nash Bargaining Solution [9℄. INRIA
How to measure eieny? 15Note that, α(Σ), α(min), and α(Π) are Pareto optimal by denition. One an easilyompute the prie of anarhy of the Nash Bargaining solution:
IΣ(α
(Π), SM,N ) =
M
M
N +
N−1
N
−−−−→
M→∞
N.The prie of anarhy is therefore unbounded. However, the fat that this alloationis Pareto-optimal and has interesting properties of fairness (it orresponds to a NashBargaining Solution [9℄) questions the relevane of the prie of anarhy notion as aPareto eieny measure.Likewise, the ineieny of the max-min fair alloation is equivalent to M forlarge values of M (as opposed to K for the non-ooperative equilibrium). It anhene be unbounded even for bounded number of appliations and mahines. Thisseems even more surprising as suh points generally result from omplex ooperationsand are hene Pareto optimal. These remarks raise one more the question of themeasure of Pareto ineieny.These are due to the fat that a poliy optimizing an index f is always non-monotone for a distint index g (from Theorem 5). Hene any poliy (inludingPareto optimal ones) optimizing a distint index from the arithmeti mean will ex-periene a bad prie of anarhy. Note that the previous problems are not spei tothe eieny measure arithmeti mean. The same kind of behavior an be exhibitedwhen using the min or the produt of the throughputs for instane.That is why we think that Pareto ineieny should be measured as the distaneto the Pareto border and not to a spei point.4.1.3 Selshness Degradation FatorTo quantify the degradation of Braess-like Paradoxes (the degree of Paradox), Kameda [4℄introdued the Pareto-omparison of α and β as ̺(α, β) = mink αkβk . Therefore, α isstritly superior to β i ̺(α, β) > 1. Intuitively ̺ represents the performane degra-dation between α and β. Using this denition, the following denition of Paretoineieny, named Selshness Degradation Fator (SDF), was proposed [6℄:
ISDF (β,U) = max
u∈U
̺(u, β(U)) = max
u∈U
min
k
uk
β(U)k
(2)Therefore β(U) is Pareto ineient as soon as ISDF (β,U) > 1 and the larger
ISDF (β,U), the more ineient the alloation.Lemma 1. Let us dene = {x ∈ Rn|∃k : xk 6 0}. We denote by a⊞ = {x ∈
R
n|∃k : xk 6 ak}.RR n° 6216
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log(U) ⊆ (log(β(U)) + ε) +Figure 8: Ineieny for the selshness degradation fator: log(U) ⊂ (log(β(U))+ε)
log(ISDF (β,U)) 6 ε ⇔ log(U) ⊆ (log(β(U)) + ε)⊞Proof.
log(ISDF (β,U)) 6 ε ⇔ max
u∈U
min
k
log(
uk
β(U)k
) 6 ε
⇔ ∀u ∈ U,∃k, log(uk) − log(β(U)k) 6 ε
⇔ ∀u ∈ U,∃k, log(uk) 6 log(β(U)k) + ε
⇔ ∀u ∈ U, log(u) ∈ (log(β(U)) + ε)⊞
⇔ log(U) ⊆ (log(β(U)) + ε)⊞Figure 8 depits a graphial interpretation of this ineieny measure. As illus-trated by the previous lemma, this ineieny seems to measure how muh β(U)should be inreased so that it is not dominated by any other points in U . Therefore,
log(ISDF (β,U)) somehow measures the distane in the log-spae from β(U) to thePareto set. However, as we will see in the next setion, this denition holds onlybeause of the very spei shape of the set U used in this example. INRIA
How to measure eieny? 17Anyway, the selshness degradation fator an, as in setion 4.1.2, be denedfrom this ineieny measure:
φ = sup
U∈U
ISDF (β,U) = sup
U∈U
max
u∈U
min
k
uk
β(U)k
.A system (e.g., queuing network, transportation network, load-balaning, ...) thatwould be suh that the Nash equilibria are always Pareto optimal would have aselshness degradation fator equal to one. The selshness degradation fator mayhowever be unbounded on systems where non-ooperative equilibria are partiu-larly ineient. The relevane of this denition is orroborated by the fat that
ε-approximations of Pareto-sets dened by Yannakakis and Papadimitriou [8℄ havea degradation fator of exp(ε) ≃ 1 + ε.4.2 A Topologial Point of ViewIn this setion, we go bak to the ineieny measure introdued in the previoussetion and show that suh a measure an be properly dened only when referringto the whole Pareto set. Indeed, what we are interested in is in fat some kind ofdistane of a point to the Pareto set. As researhers are used to look at fators whenevaluating the performane of an algorithm, this distane to the Pareto set should bemeasured in the log spae. As we have seen in the previous setion, the ineienymeasure for the selshness degradation fator is losely related to the distane tothe Pareto set. More preisely, we prove that being lose to the Pareto set impliesa small measure of ineieny. However, the onverse is true only when the utilityset has some partiular properties.The distane from β(U) to the losure of the Pareto set P(U) in the log-spae isequal to:
d∞(log(β(U), log(P(U))) = min
u∈P(u)
max
k
| log(β(U)k) − log(uk)|Therefore, we an dene
Ĩ∞(β,U) = exp(d∞(log(β(U), log(P(U)))
= min
u∈P(u)
max
k
max
(
β(U)k
uk
,
uk
β(U)k
) (3)Let us reall the lassial expansion denition:
X ⊕ a = {y|d(x, y) 6 a, for some x ∈ X}RR n° 6216
18 A. Legrand & C. TouatiThis denition an be easily expanded as:
X ⊗ a = exp(log(X) ⊕ log(a))
= {y| exp(d(log(x), log(y)) 6 a for some x ∈ X}Denition 9 (ε-approximation). [8℄ denes an ε-approximation of P(U) as a set ofpoints S suh that for all u ∈ U there exists some s ∈ S suh that ∀k : uk 6 (1+ε)sk.With the previous notations, it is easy to see that:Theorem 7. S ⊆ U is an ε-approximation of P(U) i P(U) ⊆ S ⊗ exp(ε).Figure 9(d) depits the expansion of log(P(U)) by ε so that it ontains log(β(U)).It is easy to show that:Lemma 2. Ĩ∞(β,U) 6 exp(ε) ⇔ β(U) ∈ P(U) ⊗ exp(ε).In other words, Ĩ∞(β,U) 6 exp(ε) i β(U) is no farther than ε from P(U) in thelog spae.When omparing the denitions of IΣ, ISDF and Ĩ∞, the latest may seem harderto ompute as it relies on P(U). However, what we are interested in is measuringthe distane to the Pareto set and no index-based ineieny measure an reetthis distane. Then an only reet a partiular property of the alloation suh asfairness. Note that in mono-riteria situations, it is natural to ompare a solutionto an intratable optimal solution, generally using approximations or lower bounds.Therefore, similar approahes should be used in multi-riteria settings to ompute
Ĩ∞. This ineieny measure is thus a natural extension of the lassial mono-riteriaperformane ratio.The previous denition should thus be used in the general ase, even though ina some partiular situations, the SDF denition is suient.5 ConlusionIn this paper, we have addressed the question of how to properly measure eieny ofalloations, may they be obtained as the result of some index-funtion optimizationor some general poliy. We have shown a number of results, both at qualitative andquantitative level. In partiular, we have shown that: Monotoniity is the link between index-optimization and Pareto optimality.INRIA
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γFigure 9: Distane to the Pareto set When utilities are ontinuous with the system's resoures, solution alloationsan be ontinuous in the resoures only when the utility sets are onvex. Even with Braess-free alloations, there always exists instanes where resoureinrease is detrimental to at least one user. A poliy optimizing a given index leads to errati values for another index whenutility sets grow.RR n° 6216
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y measure 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ned and is based on the logspae as the distane of a point to the Pareto border.We believe that these results an serve as a general theoreti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e of an allo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